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I. INTRODUCTION
There is only one piece of federal legislation in the United States that
explicitly regulates in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), called the United States
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, which lays out success
rate reporting requirements. Other pieces of federal legislation relate only
tangentially to assisted reproduction or fertility clinics, which leads to
redundancy and gaps in regulation, and, therefore, greater costs to
consumers seeking service in the assisted reproduction market.
This paper will review how the current state of legislative redundancy
and gaps creates negative incentives for assisted reproduction providers and
poses risks for their customers of their services. I argue that the United
States should adopt a regulatory scheme over the assisted reproduction
market that is of similar rigor to the Human Fertilisation and Embrology
Act scheme in the United Kingdom. By reviewing the process of assisted
reproduction (specifically, in vitro fertilization), the risks to which patientconsumers are exposed, the lack of remedy in the current legal landscape,
and the successes of the Human Fertilisation and Embrology Authority of
the United Kingdom, I will show that legislation on assisted reproduction
will help improve the protections for customers in the assisted reproduction
market of the United States.
The executive director of the Center for Genetics and Society, Marcy
Darnovsky, called the United States “the wild west of the fertility industry,”
a sentiment echoed by many others in the field.1 Because fertility touches
on conception and embryos, which can be hot-button political issues,
lawmakers have been resistant to touch it.2 Assisted Reproductive
1
Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of Babies
Annually, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/lightly-regulated-in-vitro-fertilization-yields-thousands-of-babiesannually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-d8a2-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=
.7cafd4cd9bcf. For an article that describes effects that an absence of regulation has on the
assisted reproduction market in terms of embryo storage, see Ariana Eunjung Cha, The
Struggle to Conceive with Frozen Eggs, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/01/27/feature/she-championedthe-idea-that-freezing-your-eggs-would-free-your-career-but-things-didnt-quite-workout/?utm_term=.4de8addcd606.
2
Michael Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fertility Industry, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-regulate-fertility-industry. See also
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Technology (“ART”), is a booming field: “[t]he number of IVF cycles done
in the United States increased by 28% from 2003 to 2012, and that rising
trend has spiked in recent years.”3 About twelve percent of women have
used ART, and about 1.5 percent of American children are conceived
through ART.4
The World Health Organization defines infertility as “a disease of the
reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy
after [twelve] months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse[],”
for which “access to . . . care falls under the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disability.”5 Yet, ART coverage is not mandated under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, despite requiring coverage for
both infant care and maternity care.6 Without the standards and oversight of
either the insurance industry or the federal government, ART consumers are
at the mercy of opportunistic providers.
Customers of ART are uniquely vulnerable, and deserve a market with
thorough and unbiased oversight. The drive to reproduce is a powerful force
for all people, and “the mere fact that so many infertile couples desperately
seek reproductive technology . . . speaks to the centrality of procreation as a
source of spiritual fulfillment for many people.”7 But, unfortunately, many
couples are unable to have children for a variety of reasons.
Adoption is not always an adequate alternative for infertile couples.
For almost all people there is a strong emotional longing for genetically
related children.8 ARTs are a powerful advance in medicine that provide
hope for childless couples. Unfortunately, in the United States, there is no
uniform federal legislation that mandates how these treatments are
administered, to whom they are available, how much they will cost, or even
what clinics may perform them.9 There is no body that ensures uniform care
Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2017) (noting that the
historical stigma of infertility has contributed to a lack of federal regulation).
3
Ellie Kincaid, A Booming Medical Industry in the U.S. is Almost Totally Unregulated,
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 7, 2015, 3:50pm), https://www.businessinsider.com/assistedreproduction-ivf-industry-regulation-2015-6.
4
Ollove, supra note 1.
5
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Sexual and Reproductive Health: Infertility
Definitions and Terminology, http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/
definitions/en/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
6
See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1), which
lists the “Essential Health Benefits” that every insurer must provide under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
7
Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2805 (2005). (hereinafter Assessing the Viability).
8
John D. Ingram, Should In Vitro Fertilization Be Covered by Medical Expense
Reimbursement Plans? 7 AM. J. FAMILY L. 103 (1993).
9
See M. Elliott Neal, Protecting Women: Preserving Autonomy in the
Commodification of Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 611, 625 (2011)
(noting that states have attempted to compensate for the lack of federal legislation).
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from clinic to clinic, oversees the billing processes of those clinics, or
issues licenses to administer ART to patients.10
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
(“HFE Act”) authorized the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(“HFEA”) to oversee accounts, record activities of fertility clinics in the
United Kingdom, and issue licenses for providing ART treatment.11 In other
developed countries, more infertile couples are able to take advantage of
IVF advances because of reimbursement and coverage schemes.12 Infertile
Americans–as consumers of ART services–deserve better protections, and
American insurers–as potential cost-bearers for IVF care–deserve better
predictability.
Because there is inadequate federal oversight13 and because IVF injury
often falls through the cracks of traditional medical malpractice regimes,14
consumers lack sufficient protection, and insurance providers have
difficulty structuring coverage for IVF, if they offer coverage at all. Private
regulators, pricing schemes, and the existing legislation create adverse
incentives for providers,15 and the childless couples for whom these
services provided hope are the ones who suffer. In vitro fertilization is the
most common (and one of the most invasive) forms of ART,16 and will be
the vehicle through which this note explores a regulatory framework. An
appropriate framework will create oversight over clinic certification,
offered procedures, and clinic standards, and will create a process for
reprimanding providers that violate the standards.
10 See Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive
Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 419, 420
(2005) (“U.S. law does not require licensing or accreditation of infertility programs and few
regulations govern embryo research.”).
11 See Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act of 1990 (“HFE Act”), §§ 6(1), 8(a) &
12. See Ouellette, supra note 10, at 422 (“In addition [to licensing], the HFEA produced a
Code of Practice with guidelines on licensed activities, and keeps a register of information
on donors, treatments, and children born through ART. It also publicizes its role, gives
advice and information, and reviews new developments in the field.”).
12 Katherine E. Abel, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for
Infertility Treatment: an Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 822 (2005).
13 See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United
States, 39 FAM. L. Q. 727, 731 (2005)(“[T]he Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification
Act of 1992 (FCSRCA). . . required the following: annual reporting of clinic-specific
success rates, listing of clinics that do not report, development of a model program for
certification of embryo laboratories, and promulgation of criteria and procedures for
approval of accreditation programs to inspect and certify embryology laboratories.”).
14 See Fox, supra note 2, at 165-66 (“[T]he malpractice tort usually affords recovery
only in cases like this one, in which a plaintiff suffers physical injury. Medical malpractice
actions in particular tend to require proof of bodily harm that is missing in many devastating
cases of reproductive negligence.”).
15 See generally Thomas H. Murray, Money-Back Guarantees for IVF: An Ethical
Critique, 25 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 292, 293 (1997).
16 Abel, supra note 12, at 821.
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II. THE PROCESS OF IVF
Alternative Reproductive Technology to treat infertility is not a
journey one would embark upon lightly. IVF is the most commonly used
medical procedure to treat infertility.17 During in vitro fertilization:
[t]he ovaries are artificially stimulated by hormones in order to
produce more than one mature egg during the menstrual cycle, and
then the eggs are removed from the ovaries using a needle-like
instrument. One or more eggs are then fertilized in an artificial
medium, such as a petri dish, using the husband’s or a donor’s
sperm, and the eggs remain in this medium until they become
fertilized and multiply into eight cells to become an embryo. These
embryos are then reimplanted into the woman’s uterus. Frequently a
number of the embryos will be cryopreserved, or frozen, for future
IVF attempts if the first treatment fails.18

The process is invasive, arduous, and intimidating for the vulnerable
couples who seek it. In addition to the large medical risk to which IVF
patients are exposed, there also is a “risk that emotionally vulnerable
infertile couples may be exploited by opportunistic IVF providers.”19 ART
customers need a guarantee of a standard of treatment available at any
clinic from which they might seek service. Consumers also need assurance
that ART providers will be more concerned with their health (and the health
of their fetus) than the clinic’s success rate.
Finding an ART provider is as simple as a Google search. The phrase
“how to find an IVF clinic” returns dozens of different clinics, boasting
great success rates, money-back guarantees, and zero-down payments. But
it is difficult to know which is the best option. By scrolling a bit further, a
hopeful ART customer might find the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention’s ART Success Rates page.20 Visitors can enter a zip code or
state, and find the success rates, contact information, and clinic services
available from those clinics.21 Patient demographic information is limited to
age and diagnosis.22 The website does not provide information on
malpractice suits, adverse health outcomes, or on financing.
17

See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 608 (2003). Other forms of ART include
Artificial Insemination, which “requires the least technological sophistication,” and Gamete
Intrafallopian Transfer, “which delivers the sperm and harvested eggs . . . directly into the
woman’s fallopian tube . . . requiring the use of a laparoscope.”
18 Abel, supra note 12, at 821.
19
Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2792.
20 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ART SUCCESS RATES,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). The most recent
clinic data available is from 2015.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Further, as technology advances, consumers of ART services need
assurance that procedures physicians are providing have been thoroughly
reviewed and tested for safety and effectiveness. As it stands, “The
government plays essentially no role in reviewing new medical procedures .
. . leaving the task of scrutinizing the safety and effectiveness of innovative
23
techniques for biomedical researchers and professional self-regulation[.]”
Researchers and professional self-regulators have different incentives than
government regulators. Because they lack enforcement power over ART
providers, they are unable to ensure public safety or health. This is not to
say that they are malicious, but that they lack the capacity to appropriately
protect ART consumers, who are vulnerable because of the emotional
difficulty of infertility and lack of legal recourses, from opportunistic
providers.
III. THE EFFECT
The range of harms that an ART consumer can experience when
undergoing IVF treatment is staggering, and the lack of consumer
protections exacerbates the potential harms. There are common errors,
explored below, caused by many careless ART providers, but there are also
cases of exceptional harm, which, as a matter of public health, we have an
interest in preventing.
A. Multi-Fetal Pregnancy
When only one embryo is implanted, the chances for a successful
pregnancy are only forty to fifty percent.24 Because the United State places
no limits on the number of embryos implanted in an IVF patient, and many
ART providers implant several, the chances of multi-fetal pregnancies are
greater.25 The United States has a higher rate of multi-fetal pregnancy and
preterm births than countries that provide insurance for IVF and place
limits on embryonic transfer.26 An Institute of Medicine report from 2006
noted that preterm births cost the United States $26 billion, mostly in
medical care, and hospitals are generally not able to recover their
expenses.27 Fertility clinics want to appear successful, and bear none of the
23

Noah, supra note 17, at 618.
Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why Federal
Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover in Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. & MARY J. OF
WOMEN & L. 135, 151(2010).
25 Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.com/id/29305552/ (“[For] women under 35, government records show
that just 83 of 426 clinics followed the [SART] guidance calling for one and no more than
two embryos. The average for fresh embryos (as opposed to frozen) implanted in women in
that age group ranged from a 1.4 to 4.8. The vast majority of the clinics averaged between
two and three embryos.”).
26 Davidson, supra note 24 at 149-50. See also Abel, supra note 12 at 822.
27 Id. at 148 and 139.
24
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costs associated with multi-fetal pregnancies, so there is no incentive for
them to stop multi-embryonic transfer.28 Rather, they congratulate their
customers’ pregnancy, and report another successful pregnancy.
Patients who undergo multi-fetal pregnancies experience a higher risk
of ectopic pregnancy, gestational diabetes, and preeclampsia.29 Older
patients, in particular, are more likely to suffer damage to their
cardiovascular and renal systems.30 Parents of multiple children suffer
psychological harm and fatigue, and are more likely to suffer “depression,
alcohol and drug abuse, and divorce.”31
The risks posed by multi-fetal pregnancies are not limited to the
consumer. They put the ultimate product of the service, the fetus, in danger.
Twins are born prematurely fifty-one percent of the time, and triplets are
born prematurely ninety-one percent of the time.32 (For context, single-fetus
pregnancies only end in premature labor 9.4 percent of the time).33 Preterm
babies are usually low-weight, which increases medical care costs during
their first year of life, and increases risk of death or serious disability later
in life.34 Moreover, the risk of major birth defects is higher among children
born from multi-fetal pregnancies.35 Those defects can include “blindness,
brain damage, and respiratory problems.”36 Additionally, children born
through IVF may suffer “higher blood pressure, adiposity, glucose levels,
and . . . vascular abnormalities[.]”37
B. Laboratory Mix-Ups
Currently, ART labs have no special licensing requirements.38 The
most common harms caused by IVF are mix-ups, including “mishandl[ing]
sperm, eggs, or embryos . . . fertiliz[ing] eggs with strangers’ sperm or
implant[ing] embryos into the wrong person.”39 Though the phrase “mixup” sounds lighthearted, the trauma of having an ART provider implant the
wrong reproductive material into an ART consumer should not be
understated. A study of ART labs in the United States showed “more than
28

Noah, supra note 17 at 626.
See generally id. at 620-22.
30 Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2810 (Internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Davidson, supra note 24, at 149. Internal quotation marks omitted.
32 Davidson, supra note 24 , at 147.
33 Id.
34 See generally id. at 147-49. Davidson also notes that children born through IVF (but
not necessarily a multi-fetal pregnancy) are more likely to suffer cardiovascular, urogenital,
and musculoskeletal defects than children conceived naturally.
35 Noah, supra note 17, at 620-22.
36 Note, Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2809-10.
37 Honor Whiteman, IVF: Risks May Outweigh Benefits, Say Experts, MEDICAL NEWS
TODAY (Jan. 29, 2014). https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/271785.php.
38 Ouellette, supra note 10 at 429.
39 Fox, supra note 2 at 193-94.
29
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one in five report errors in diagnosing, labeling, and handling donor
samples[,] and embryos for implantation.”40 The rate of these mix-ups is
unacceptably high considering the financial and emotional stakes of IVF.
Though ART laboratories have to be certified by the American
College of Pathologists,41 the standards they have to meet are general, and
do not capture the needs an ART laboratory may have. The Centers for
Disease Control’s (“CDC”) model laboratory program envisioned by the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act42 was never adopted
across the United States, and neither performance criteria nor approval
standards were issued.43 A lab in California had mold in the area where
embryos were stored and was “cited for not properly training staff and
storing drugs.”44
IV. PHYSICAL INJURIES
Unfortunately, when undergoing IVF procedures (or other procedures
meant to facilitate pregnancy) ART customers often suffer physical harm.
In an article on physician probation, Consumer Reports highlights Dr.
Leonard Kurian of southern California, who “removed the wrong ovary
from a 37-year-old woman . . . .”45 The California State Medical Board
found that he “[f]ailed to provide her informed consent,” and failed to use
“a detailed history and physical exam to formulate a . . . plan of
treatment.”46 Kurian treated another woman without having a history of
previous pregnancies, a list of her medications, or a family history.47 On a
different woman, Kurian performed a labiaplasty without sufficient
knowledge or training.48
Malissa Pineda went to Dr. Rifaat Salem because of his success rate,
but her experience was hardly happy and successful.49 After implanting
40

Id. at 152.
Ollove, supra note 1.
42 See U.S. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263
(hereinafter “FSCRCA”).
43 Adamson, supra note 13, at 732.
44 Bernice Yeung & Jonathan Jones, When Pregnancy Dreams Become IVF Nightmares,
REVEAL NEWS, (Jun. 01, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/when-pregnancydreams-become-ivf-nightmares/.
45 Rachel Peachman, What You Don’t Know About Your Doctor Could Hurt You,
CONSUMER REPORTS, (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/doctorsand-hospitals/what-you-dont-know-about-your-doctor-could-hurt-you/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/SW8P-ZPPF].
46 Leonard Sunil Kurian, Case No. 05-2011-214708. ¶ 42 (1-2) (Med. Bd. of Cal. Dep’t
of Consumer Affairs Apr. 8, 2014) (first amended accusation).
47 Id. at ¶ 28 (1).
48 Id. at ¶ 77 (1).
49 Yeung, supra note 44. Salem’s aberrant behavior is well-documented in a
constellation of suits. See First Amended Complaint for Rodriguez v. Salem, BC626618
(Super. Ct. Cal. 2017); Said v. Salem, PC040905 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008); Young v. Salem, YC
41
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three embryos in Pineda and instructing her to stay on bed rest, Salem asked
her to come back into the office.50 His embryologist explained that there
was an error with her embryos, and Salem asked if they wanted to have the
embryos out that day or the next day.51 He did not explain what procedure
would get them out, and did not get Pineda’s informed consent.52
Pineda described feeling a “painful scraping” when she was having the
embryos removed, which was a dilation and curettage, an abortive
procedure.53 As a result of the procedure, Pineda “started having fits of rage
and anger. She was crying all the time. She couldn’t sleep. She did her best
to push those feelings out of her mind because she believed staying positive
would help her get pregnant more easily.”54 The trauma she experienced
caused anxiety, poor memory, and panic attacks.55
While Malissa Pineda’s story is an extreme example, it is not
completely anomalous. At least one other woman alleged that Salem had
performed a similar “follow-up surgery” on her.56 If you find the current
state of IVF in the United States shocking, it can be explained by the
business-oriented development of ART in the United States, the lack of
uniform and comprehensive federal oversight, and the inadequacy of the
legal system to respond to ART harm.
V. THE CURRENT (LACK OF) FEDERAL REGULATION
The ART field in the United States is “a field characterized by strong
anti-regulatory sentiment because it evolved as a business, not a research
enterprise. . . .”57 This resistance, coupled with the fact that reproduction is
a political lightning rod,58 means there is only one piece of legislation that
explicitly calls out IVF providers.59 The United States Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act (“FCSRCA”), passed in 1992, requires
only that fertility clinics report their rate of successful pregnancies to
050743 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2005); Complaint, Domingo v. Rosenberg, BC563660 (Super. Ct. Cal.
2008).
50 Yeung & Jones, supra note 44.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. See also Said v. Salem, PC040905 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008).
57 Ollove, supra note 1.
58 Ollove, supra note 2 (Pew Charitable Trusts).
59 There are other federal healthcare programs that can affect ART providers, but they
are not uniform, and can lead to redundancy and confusion. See Davidson, supra note 24, at
728 (noting that the Federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1988 governs labs that
test hormones, the National Institutes of Health regulates funding, the Food and Drug
Administration regulates genetic testing, the Federal Trade Commission regulates clinic
advertising, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sets payment levels).
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CDC.60 However, the FCSRCA “fails to give the CDC the authority to
enforce the data-reporting requirement, and simply outlines a voluntary
system of licensing that has not been implemented or enforced.”61 Clinics
that do not report to the CDC face no legal consequences.62 Further, the
FCSRCA “did not . . . create any mechanism for reporting adverse events
encountered during fertility treatments.”63
The FCSRCA requires that fertility clinics report success rates, which
are then made publicly available. As a result, providers are incentivized to
make their clinics appear as successful as possible, so they can attract more
ART customers. Because the odds of successful pregnancy resulting from
IVF are so low,64 profit incentives led to the practice of multi-embryonic
transfers.65 Success rate reporting, combined with the advent of moneyback guarantees,66 drives providers to do what it takes to ensure a greater
chance of success from one cycle of IVF. This often means “a higher dose
of fertility drugs, a more invasive egg retrieval, implanting more embryos
(and possibly having to eliminate some to improve the survival chances of
the others).”67
Not only do multi-gestational pregnancies pose many health risks for
the consumers, multi-gestational pregnancies pose a financial risk to the
insurer that disincentivizes coverage. Maternity benefits packages generally
include “coverage for labor and delivery, regardless of the number of
children.”68 But, for multi-gestational pregnancies, those costs multiply.
Other countries have recognized the ugly risks of implanting multiple
60 FRCSA, supra note 42, 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)(1), set out the reporting requirements. The
reporting results can be accessed through the Centers for Disease Control Website, at
https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q44Q-HDBW]. The data
collected includes: patient demographics, obstetric and medical history, infertility diagnoses,
clinical parameters of the ART procedure used, and information about the resulting
pregnancies and births.
61 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 422.
62 Id. at 420. Further, compliance with the reporting requirements was entirely
voluntary, and no penalties would result from failing to report. See Lee Kuo, Lessons
Learned from Great Britain’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Act: Should the United
States Regulate the Fate of Unused Frozen Embryos, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1027,
1032 (1997).
63 Noah, supra note 17, at 615.
64 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 151 (“A successful pregnancy occurs only forty to
fifty percent of the time when a single embryo is transferred for implantation[,]” so “each
attempt at [in vitro fertilization] is a financial gamble[,]” but “[s]uccess rates increase as the
number of embryos increase.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 Noah, supra note 17, at 626.
66
Murray, supra note 15, at 292.
67 Id. at 293. See also Note, supra note 7, at 2811 (“[D]octors may transfer excessively
high numbers of embryos in order to inflate the clinic’s success rate figures without heeding
the risks to patient health[]”, or “may start fertility treatment . . . before a woman’s infertility
can be confirmed.”).
68 Davidson, supra note 24, at 142.
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embryos, and have limited the number of embryos to two-to-four per cycle
to reduce the chance of multi-gestational pregnancy.69 Many of the same
countries provide coverage for IVF, which shows that they have “lower
rates of embryo implantation and lower rates of multi-fetal pregnancy than
the United States.”70 The United States has taken no steps to reduce the
incentives that lead to multi-embryonic transfers. But, by creating a system
that reduces multi-embryonic transfer, the United States could create
greater confidence in the effectiveness of ART treatment, and ensure that
ART patients are exposed to fewer of the health risks that multi-embryonic
transfers pose.
The FCSRCA did call for the development of a model program for
certifying labs and creating criteria and procedures for ART programs.71
And the CDC developed the program; however, “since responsibility for
implementing such programs is a state function, no national certification
program was actually implemented . . . for financial . . . reasons.”72 But
even in the program that the CDC developed, there were no minimum
safety requirements for ART procedures.73 Because there is no federal
program that explicitly oversees and provides guidance for ART providers,
it can be difficult for consumers to compare clinics without relying on
professional regulators that lack the capacity to enforce their standards.
The FCSRCA, though well-intentioned, is inadequate to protect ART
customers. It does not establish clear, mandatory standards for clinic
licensing. First, it does not establish minimal safety requirements for
physicians and clinics. Second, it does not establish any oversight body.
Third, it has no enforcement mechanism. And finally, it does not provide
any consumer protections to ART customers from ART providers. Overall,
it fails to address and resolve the key problems posed by the ART market.
And though there are other federal healthcare programs that may reach IVF,
“there are multiple overseeing authorities,” which “has resulted in
inconsistencies, duplication, and . . . inappropriate regulations.”74 As a
result, insurers do not feel comfortable covering ART, and ART consumers
suffer. Should Congress pass legislation that relates to ART generally, or
IVF specifically, it must create a body that can oversee licensing, safety
standards, accounting and records, and policies of IVF clinics in the United
States.

69

Noah, supra note 17, at 620-21. See also Adamson, supra note 13, at 740.
Davidson, supra note 24, at 149-50.
71 See FCSRCA 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1997).
72 Adamson, supra note 13, at 732. There has not been any promulgation of standards
for fertility clinics.
73 Neal, supra note 9, at 624.
74 Adamson, supra note 13, at 737.
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VI. THE (INADEQUACY OF) STATE REGULATION
As it stands, the IVF market in the United States is governed by “a
patchwork of private insurance and enterprise, state law, and federal
regulation.”75 As wielders of police powers, states generally have authority
over family law and health.76 And states have a large interest in regulating
IVF as a matter of public health, because of the high risk of multiple
pregnancies. Not only do multiple pregnancies mean increased cost, but
they also generally result in adverse health events for both the newborn and
the pregnant individual.77 Still, states have largely abdicated that
responsibility when it comes to ART, failing to implement safety standards
or model programs for IVF clinics.78 A Washington Post article from 2015
noted that states do not regulate “how many children may be conceived
from one donor, what types of medical information or updates must be
supplied by donors, which genetic tests may be performed on embryos, how
many fertilized eggs may be placed in a woman or how old a donor can
be.”79
Some states have indirectly regulated IVF by mandating insurance
coverage for the procedure. However, in states that have statutory mandates
for IVF coverage, requirements vary widely from “age restrictions for
patients who seek the service, number of employees necessary for
employers to be covered under the legislation, residence of the insured,
number of in vitro cycles covered, number of embryos transferred per cycle
or lifetime, whether donor eggs may be used, and lifetime monetary
caps.”80 Some states only allow for insurance providers to offer IVF
coverage “where a woman’s eggs are fertilized with her husband’s
sperm.”81
Though variance in state regulation is understandable, given the
different preferences in each state, when it comes to healthcare and
insuring, the differences can have harmful results. For example, “when an
individual works in one state but the insurance plan is from another state,
she is not necessarily covered by the state plan mandating insurance
75 Joan Mahoney, Great Britain’s National Health Service and Assisted Reproduction,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 403, 404 (2009).
76 See Seema Mohapatra, Stateless Babies & Adoption Scams: A Bioethical Analysis of
International Commercial Surrogacy, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 412 (2012) (noting that the
wide variety of surrogacy regulation from state-to-state causes great expense and confusion).
77 Note, supra note 7, at 2809-10.
78 Ollove, supra note 1.
79 Id. See Neal, supra note 9, at 625 (noting that licensure requirements are a method
through which states regulate ART providers).
80 Davidson, supra note 24, at 169. Despite the fact that there are limits on coverage,
some argue that this is still better than nothing, given that mandatory coverage gives insurers
a stake in improving the quality and consistency of IVF care. See Note, In Vitro
Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2104 (1996).
81 Davidson, supra note 24, at 169.
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companies to cover the procedure.”82 Meaning, a woman who lives and
works in Chicago, whose employer uses Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Missouri, will be subject to the limitations that Missouri places on ART and
IVF. Later, I will explore how this may provide Congress justification to
regulate the ART market, because it implicates the commerce clause.
VII. PRIVATE REGULATORS, PUBLIC COST
The United States ART market is regulated primarily by private health
provider associations, namely the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (“SART”) and the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (“ASRM”).83 Moreover, until passage of the FCSRCA, data
collection on ART rested on those two organizations.84 Membership in
these organizations is entirely voluntary,85 but, as SART notes on its
membership page, joining them links providers with potential ART
customers seamlessly.86
It is important to note that, although they have been involved in
passing limited legislation87 and work in collaboration with public entities,88
SART and ASRM are private entities. SART is incorporated as an entity
separate from ASRM, but members are required to join ASRM too.89
Members pay an annual fee of three hundred dollars, a data collection fee of
five hundred dollars, and other additional fees.90 That private regulators
dominate the industry is not surprising. The National Institutes of Health
has limited ability to fund human embryonic research, consequently, IVF
was primarily developed privately, as a consumer health service, as
opposed to a research endeavor.91 Private development (combined with the
political lightning rod of reproductive rights) meant that IVF could escape
government oversight and regulation.92 And without the watchful eye of a
82

Id. at 169-70.
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.sart.org, (last visited
October 21, 2017). American Society for Reproductive Medicine, http://www.
reproductivefacts.org/?vs=1&_ga=2.245256773.1376975830.1508602543-1806400130.
1508602543 (for patients), http://www.asrm.org/?vs=1 (for providers)(last visited October
21, 2017).
84 Ouellette et al., supra note 10, at 424.
85
Id. at 429.
86 Join SART: Benefits of SART Membership, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., (last
visited October 21, 2017) http://www.sart.org/professionals-and-providers/join-sart/.
87 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 731 (noting SART’s involvement in the FCSRCA).
88 See National ART Surveillance, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
(January 9, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html (noting the CDC’s collaboration
with SART for reporting).
89 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 424.
90 Id. at 424-25.
91 See Kincaid, supra note 3.
92 Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2794. See also Ollove, supra note 1 (“Debra
Mathews of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics agrees that the industry is
83
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regulatory overseer, ART clinics may put profits and reputation of success
above all else, even if it means their patients suffer adverse consequences
from higher doses of fertility drugs, multi-fetal pregnancies, or invasive
procedures.93
SART is not an accrediting agency, and only controls the behavior of
its members.94 The most significant role that both SART and ASRM have is
issuing practice guidelines to their membership. A Business Insider report
notes that practice committees meet to write opinions on new ART
procedures, treatments, and research, and to issue guidance.95 However,
“[n]ew procedures do not have to be approved before they can be
performed in clinics,” and providers do not have to adhere to the practice
committee guidance.96 In fact, current data shows that most fertility clinics
do not follow SART or ASRM guidance.97 A representative of the
California-based Center for Genetics and Society noted that “[t]here are
enough clinics that quite openly flout professional guidelines that we really
do need to start thinking about public policy in this area.”98 SART may
promulgate guidelines that would mitigate the public health and cost risks
associated with IVF, but, as the data shows, most fertility clinics do not
heed those guidelines.
But, despite the brazen violations of their guidelines by ART
providers, there is little SART and ASRM can do in terms of enforcement.
The most drastic measure that SART can take in response to transgressions
by ART providers is to revoke membership.99 But, “[t]his does nothing to
improve the quality of a clinic for which membership status is not
important.”100 As much as SART and ASRM may cherish their role as the
overseers of the ART industry in the United States, they are clearly having
little effect on increasing the quality of assisted reproductive healthcare. If
membership (and, by extension, adherence to membership requirements) is
optional, and their members are not reprimanded for the harm they cause to
vulnerable ART customers, something else must be done.
Customers navigating the ART industry deserve regulation that clears
the landscape, so they can find, access, and benefit from quality care.
Ouellette identifies four key issues resulting from the lack of ART
regulation in the United States, all of which affect ART consumers:
lightly regulated because ‘assisted reproduction has grown up as a medical services business
not under the auspices of medical research.’”).
93 Murray, supra note 15, at 293.
94 Id. at 434.
95 Kincaid, supra note 3.
96 Id.
97 Davidson, supra note 24, at 150.
98 Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, MSNBC.COM, (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.
msnbc.com/id/29305552/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 434.
100 Id.
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[1] Poor quality clinics will remain open and will propagate morally
questionable and/or sloppy clinical practices, whether on purpose or
unintentionally. Some of these cases will make headlines while
others will go unpublicized. [2] The availability, reliability, and
clarity of ART success rate data will continue to be poor so that
consumers will have difficulty determining the quality of individual
clinics. [3] Clinics that cut corners on voluntary data reporting,
advertising, and practice guidelines will achieve commercial success
at the expense of better quality clinics with whom they compete. [4]
Poor quality clinics will harm the reputation of the field of ART as a
whole.101

An effective regulatory scheme will: promulgate standard operating
procedures and expectations for care, adequately supervise clinics to ensure
they are meeting those standards, keep detailed records, make the records
available to consumers, create limits on advertising, and work to ensure that
ART has a reputation for reliability in the United States.
VIII. THE GAPS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
Despite the horrifying consequences that can happen in the
unregulated market, patients who suffer harm as a result of the lack of
oversight of the ART market will find no hope in the current legal regime.
Despite having theoretical options in medical malpractice law, contract law,
and negligence tort law, courts are not interested in providing relief. In
these traditional areas of the law, courts lack the experience or imagination
necessary to handle the nuance of cases in which reproductive harm (that is
largely emotional) is at the epicenter of the case.
A. Medical Malpractice
Unfortunately, traditional medical malpractice regimes do not
incentivize providers to align their behavior to provide a higher level of
care to ART patients. Fox notes that “[m]alpractice actions . . . call for . . .
more tangible setbacks to the injured party’s person or possessions[,]” and
that courts generally do not offer relief when providers “negligently
deprive, impose, or confound procreation[,]” because there is often not a
physical harm or property loss.102 Since medical malpractice generally
requires physical harm, in cases where sperm or ova are damaged,
destroyed, lost, misappropriated, or otherwise harmed, relief is not possible
from medical malpractice. This means that, even if ART consumers could
access relief through tort law, medical malpractice insurance would not pay
out, and relief would be limited to the personal assets of the provider. The
current legal options do not provide ART consumers with adequate
protection, given the stakes of reproductive medicine.
101
102

Id.
Fox, supra note 2, at 154.
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As a result, ART consumers who suffer “switched sperm, lost
embryos, and misdiagnosed fetuses”103 have no legal recourse, and must
simply tolerate it, because there is no physical harm (or at least barely
detectable physical harm). Though they may be able to state a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, “[c]ourts hardly ever let plaintiffs
recover for standalone emotional harm.”104 There are currently “twenty
states [that] refuse to consider the merits of [] professional-malpractice
actions against forced procreation.” That is, when providers fail to provide
testing (or miscommunicate testing), which results in a child being born
with an anomaly, there is no recourse against the provider.105 Though many
genetic anomalies may be harmless, in cases of serious genetic illnesses,
ART consumers may be seriously harmed by that negligence, and they lack
the ability to seek compensation for that harm.
B. Contract, Tort, and Property Claims
Contract cases are complicated by the fact that many ART providers
decline to promise specific results,106 so it’s difficult to definitively say that
they violated the terms of their agreements. And because many of the harms
are emotional, lacking an economic or physical component, tort law often
declines a remedy as well.107 Property law doesn’t recognize the “symbolic
value of . . . eggs and embryos or the costly procedures required to extract
or create them.”108 Often, reproductive misconduct deprives patients of the
ability to procreate in the future, and courts are not yet able to deal with
that. Though it is outside the scope of this article, the lack of an adequate
cause of action for reproductive harm is reflective of the private, marketdriven, and unregulated ART industry in the United States. Providers can
run amok, and ART consumers, lacking adequate protection from the
government, are harmed. Legislation that set up a regulatory body could
also introduce causes of action for ART consumers who experience harm
resulting from negligent reproductive healthcare providers.
IX. THE UK MODEL
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
of 1990 (“HFE Act”) empowered the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (“HFEA”) to license, oversee, and promulgate codes of practice
for in vitro fertilization.109 The HFE Act was developed after an extensive
103 Id. at 159. Fox further notes that because of the “sparse reporting requirements” in the
United States, there is no way to know exactly how frequently these “mix-ups” happen.
104 Id. at 169.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 154.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See HFE Act, supra note 11, at §§ 1-4.

216

Adopting a UK Framework for Assisted Reproduction
39:201 (2019)

investigation into the public health implications of ART, conducted
subsequent to the first successful “test tube” birth in the United
Kingdom.110 The United Kingdom opted for a streamlined and authoritative
approach, where the United States opted to allow the industry to develop
through the market. Having an expert authority regulating the industry has
resulted in high-quality research and practice, putting the United Kingdom
at the forefront of the ART field.111 By adopting a similar framework, the
United States could increase the predictability and safety of in vitro
fertilization, reduce adverse incentives, make it more appealing for insurers
to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization, and increase the quality and
amount of research that advances ART and infertility care.
A. Licensing
HFEA is the sole body authorized to oversee all fertility clinics and
human embryo research in the United Kingdom.112 It issues licenses to any
clinics and laboratories operating in the ART field, which fall into one of
three categories: “licenses for fertility treatment, licenses for embryo
storage, and licenses for research on human embryos or gametes.”113
Whereas in the United States, accreditation is an optional undertaking for
an ART clinic, British law mandates that any embryology or fertilization
enterprise get and maintain a license.114
The HFE Act sets out general conditions for all licensees, as well as
specific conditions applying to the categories.115 The general conditions for
licensees alone are far more extensive than the CDC’s success rate
reporting requirements. The HFE Act requires that licensees maintain
adequate books and records, and supply copies or extracts to HFEA upon
request.116 The HFE Act also mandates:
that any member or employee of the Authority, on production, if so
required, of a document identifying the person as such, shall at all
reasonable times be permitted to enter those premises and inspect
them (which includes inspecting any equipment or records and
observing any activity).117
110
Erin L. Nelson, Perspectives on the Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies
in the United Kingdom and Canada, 43 ALTA. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2006)(Called the
“Warnock Committee,” after its chairperson, the Committee came to the conclusion “that
regulatory oversight of ARTs and embryo research was required to protect the public, and
that the regulatory function should be played by an expert body[.]”).
111 Id. at 1047.
112 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 420.
113 Id. at 428.
114 Id. at 431.
115 HFE Act, supra note 11, at §§ 12-15.
116 Id. at §12(d),(g).
117 Id. at § 12(b).
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Licensees submit themselves to rigorous oversights by a public body,
and inspections at any time. In contrast, SART member clinics in the
United States only have to be inspected every two years.118
An anti-regulation argument against the kind of oversight that the HFE
Act employs might suggest that worrying about inspections prevent a clinic
from being able to operate freely. ART industry actors in the United
Kingdom suggest that this is not the case. In a press release, the British
Fertility Society (“BFS”) expressed its belief that the HFE Act “has been of
enormous reassurance to the public and to those scientists and clinicians
working in what is often perceived as one of the most controversial areas of
medical practice.”119 The BFS also noted that the IVF clinics in the United
Kingdom licensed by the HFEA, “have worked effectively for many years
within this framework, providing the highest quality of care for patients.”120
B. Guidance and the Code of Practice
The HFE Act mandates that HFEA promulgate a Code of Practice
(“Code”).121 The Code is drafted by the HFEA, approved (or disapproved)
by the Secretary of State, and, after approval, sent to Parliament.122 The
HFE Act notes a number of potentially appropriate subjects for the Code,
and the HFEA has done its best to issue detailed guidance.123 Though
violating of the Code may not be enough to start proceedings against the
offender, a licensing committee may review whether any licensing
conditions were violated and may consider the Code violation in its
determination.124
The Code allows HFEA to “establish[] boundaries beyond which
treatment and research may not venture, define[] technologies to be
licensed, and determine[] the legal status of the resulting children.”125 To
issue up-to-date and comprehensive guidance, the HFEA employees a
118

Ouellette, supra note 10, at 425.
Regulation of Assisted Reproduction in the UK, BRITISH FERTILITY SOCIETY, (Feb. 16,
2006), https://britishfertilitysociety.org.uk/press-release/regulation-of-assisted-reproductionin-the-uk/.
120 Id.
121 HFE Act, supra note 11, at § 25(1).
122 Id. at § 26.
123 Nelson, supra note 110, at 1029 (“The [HFEA] Code of Practice, now in its sixth
iteration, provides detailed guidance regarding the following: qualifications and
responsibilities of staff employed by licensed centres; facilities and administrative
procedures for licensed centres; assessments of the welfare of the child and of persons
seeking treatment; assessment and screening of potential gamete donors; provision of
information to donors and to service recipients; consent; counselling; use, storage and
handling of gametes and embryos; research; records and confidentiality; complaints;
preimplantation testing; witnessing clinical and laboratory procedures; and intra-cytoplasmic
sperm injection.”)(Internal quotation marks omitted).
124 HFE Act, supra note 11, at § 25(6)(a-b).
125 Kuo, supra note 62, at 1036.
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“horizon scanning panel”, which serves to identify “new developments that
may impact on the field of ART or embryo research.”126 It uses “issues
identified in journal articles, conferences and/or suggestions and advice
from international experts in the field of ART and embryo research via
internet communication, questionnaires and a meeting once a year.”127
There is not legislation in the United States nor guidance from the CDC on
what new treatment or technology may be used on patients.
C. Register
In the United States, information collection by the CDC is strictly
limited to success rate data.128 The HFE Act requires that the HFEA
maintain a register of any information relating to “the provision of
treatment services for any identifiable individual, the keeping or use of the
gametes of any identifiable individual or of an embryo taken from any
identifiable woman,” or if the information “shows that any identifiable
individual was, or may have been, born in consequence of treatment
services.”129 Those who may be concerned about a lack of privacy can sleep
easily knowing that no one in the HFEA may disclose any of the
information in the register, except to the Registrar General or other
employees of HFEA.130 Not only does this register allow the HFEA to
monitor for potential violations of the Code or of the HFE Act, it also
facilitates new and enlightening statistics about the state of IVF in the
United Kingdom. In the United States, the lack of information leaves most
of us in the dark when it comes to the ART industry.
D. Enforcement
In the United States, there are “no legal consequences for nonaccredited [clinics]”, nor is there a “consumer-recognized seal of approval
or standard symbol that conveys that any minimum standards of quality
have been met.”131 HFEA, on the other hand, is authorized to “refuse,
revoke, or suspend a license,” and may submit clinics and laboratories that
violate the HFE Act to the Director of Public Prosecutions.132 If convicted,
violators “may be charged with a prison term of up to ten years and a
fine.”133 For violations of HFEA’s Code of Practice, licensees may have
126 Sonia Allan, Regulatory Design Strategies and Enforcement Approaches for Research
Involving Suman Embryos and Cloning in Australia and the United Kingdom – Time for a
Change, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 617, 623-24 (2010).
127 Id.
128 Kuo, supra note 62, at 1036.
129 HFE Act, supra note 11, at § 31(1-2).
130 Id. at § 33.
131 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. at 428.
133 Id.
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their licenses reviewed and revoked.134 During premises inspections, an
HFEA inspector is authorized to take possession of anything, which may be
relevant to a license violation or that may be used in evidence in
proceedings, and may take steps to preserve anything necessary.135 The
HFE Act also authorizes Justices of the Peace to issue warrants on the oath
of a member or employee of HFEA, given reasonable grounds for
suspecting a violation of the HFE Act.136
X. SCHEMES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
The per capita usage of IVF procedures is far higher in other
developed countries such as Australia, France, Japan, and Germany.137 By
using social security reimbursement strategies or cost-sharing schemes,
they are able to increase the number of people who are able to take
advantage of new ART technology to grow their families.138 Like the
United Kingdom, Australia enforces standards with criminal sanctions.139
These countries also place important limits on IVF that reduce the
likelihood of multi-fetal pregnancies and increase the safety of IVF
practice, even if they do not have quite as rigorous a framework as the
United Kingdom.140
In Germany, for example, The Embryo Protection Act of 1990 limits
the number of embryos that may be collected for fertilization to three.141
Germany uses a managed care system, where medical innovation must be
evaluated for coverage through an application that “must describe the
usefulness of the new procedure, its medical necessity, and its costeffectiveness compared to already covered care.”142 The Joint Federal
Committee must, in particular, adopt guidelines for “medical services in
cases of infertility.”143
134

HFE Act, supra note 11, at § 25(6)(a-b).
Id. § 39(1).
136 Id. § 40.
137 Abel, supra note 12, at 822.
138 Id.
139 Allan, supra note 124, at 621.
140 Australia’s limits on ART are arguably not conducive to increasing use of IVF
services. See Adamson, supra note 13, at 739-740 (“Australia, and particularly the state of
Victoria, has strongly regulated IVF since 1984 with The Medical Procedures (Infertility)
Bill. The bill defined life as starting at the time of fertilization, mandated a two-year wait for
commencement of IVF unless both fallopian tubes were blocked, made a second medical
opinion necessary before IVF could be performed, did not allow the physician initially
recommending IVF to perform the procedure, and made marriage compulsory before a
couple could gain access to reproductive technology.”).
141 Adamson, supra note 13, at 740.
142 Ursula Weide, Coverage and Medical Necessity Determinations: U.S. Managed Care
Treatment Decisions versus German Administrative Rulemaking, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 507, 567 (2002).
143 Id. at 563.
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Though the German regulations do not reach quite as far into the ART
industry as those in the United Kingdom, they establish far more control
than the United States. Germany places limits on the number of ova that can
be harvested, and creates an oversight process for evaluating innovative
treatments and procedures. By doing this， Germany reduces the number
of multi-fetal pregnancies144 and ensures that all the procedures being
practiced on German ART consumers are adequate, safe, and thoroughly
tested.
XI. A BETTER REGULATORY SCHEME
The comprehensive regulatory framework of the HFE Act and HFEA
protects British ART consumers from opportunistic ART providers much
more effectively than the regulations in the United States. The HFE Act
also has consequences in place when ART providers engage in
inappropriate conduct, which poses a risk to British ART consumers. Why
can’t ART consumers in the United States be protected in a similar way?
As previously noted, reproductive healthcare tends to be a political
lightning rod that members of Congress want to avoid, but there’s another
explanation.
The private regulators that were so involved in the drafting and
passage of the FCSRCA and “the multibillion-dollar fertility industry in
America mount[] powerful lobbying forces against occasional calls for
regulation.”145 The United States healthcare is market-driven: “[s]elfregulation is the longstanding tradition for medical professionals.”146 By
contrast, the National Health Service (“NHS”) funds most healthcare in the
United Kingdom. The NHS covers “health care and social costs for children
born of ART, even if those costs are extraordinary as a result of the
actualized risks of privately funded ART procedures.”147 And though
private health providers may set their own rates,148under certain conditions,
IVF is covered under the NHS.149
Still, the physical and psychological health of uniquely vulnerable
consumers should be more important to members of Congress, and they
should act. Justification for legislation of this kind could potentially be
found in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,150 given that unequal
144 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 149 (noting that other developed countries have a
lower rate of multi-fetal pregnancies than the United States).
145 Fox, supra note 2, at 149.
146 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 444.
147 Id. at 445.
148
See Costs and Funding, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY (last
visited January 23, 2018), https://www.hfea.gov.uk/treatments/explore-all-treatments/costsand-funding/.
149 See National Health Service, Availability, (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.nhs.uk/
Conditions/IVF/Pages/Availability.aspx.
150 United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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treatment of IVF in one state could affect the IVF market in a neighboring
state.151
Currently, data shows that most clinics in the United States do not
follow SART and ASRM guidelines.152 There are no teeth behind the
private regulators’ guidance; the most that SART and ASRM can do to a
noncompliant clinic is to revoke their membership status.153 Perhaps an
aggrieved ART consumer could bring a malpractice suit, but it may never
make it to the court, either because it doesn’t adequately meet the
requirements of medical malpractice,154 or because it’s settled. At the end of
the day, the clinic faces no consequences, and can keep attracting patients
via an ill-advised success rate system.
An ideal framework of ART regulation will be independent, will take
into account patients, providers, and the public, and will be free from
political, religious, or moral agendas.155 If the United States were to adopt a
framework modeled after the HFE Act and HFEA, it should be sure to
adopt a licensing requirements, an inspection system, and an enforcement
mechanism. By adopting those provisions, ART providers would have clear
licensing conditions to follow, as opposed to optional accreditation. Clear
standards of practice could be promulgated to all fertility and embryology
entities in the United States, as opposed to the SART membership
standards. And, those standards could be backed up by enforcement
mechanisms, both civil and criminal.
XII. JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULATION
Congress can regulate channels of commerce (like common carriers
and motels), instrumentalities of commerce (things moved through
interstate commerce), and activities having significant impact on interstate
commerce (like pricing goods that may be moved through interstate
commerce).156 Because of the way the insurance market operates state-bystate, and because ART customers may travel to specific ART providers in
other states, the current ART market implicates the commerce clause,
which would provide Congress justification for regulating it.157 Some states
disincentivize use of ART by single mothers and gay couples. This doesn’t
mean that those people will remain childless, but, more likely, it means that
they will travel to another state to get it. Further, some states limit the ways
that insurance companies can cover ART. If a woman lives in Illinois, but
151

See generally, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Davidson, supra note 24, at 150.
153 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 434.
154 See generally Fox, supra note 2, at 154.
155 Adamson, supra note 13, at 737-38.
156 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
157 The lack of uniform law concerning surrogacy poses similar problems. See generally
Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 412.
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her employer provides Blue Cross Blue Shield of Missouri, she is subject to
the limitation that Missouri places on insurers. Because of the way laws in
one state can affect residents of another state, Congress could suggest that
ART is an instrumentality of commerce, and pass regulation that improves
the quality of ART care for consumers and provides an enforcement
mechanism for reprimanding substandard care.
Without comprehensive legislations, Congress could instead make
infertility treatment an essential health benefit under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Currently, the ACA mandates coverage
for infant and maternity care.158 By making infertility treatment an essential
health benefit, Congress would enable insurance companies to set limits on
procedures and standards of treatment. Insurance companies “could use the
industry information from ASRM and SART to set guidelines for
reimbursements and then mandate that coverage be provided only for
clinics that report according to federal law or adhere strictly to professional
guidelines.”159 Insurance companies could then link clinic reimbursement
“to a requirement that physicians either follow industry guidelines or justify
why they did not follow the guidelines.”160 So, by mandating coverage for
infertility care, Congress could improve the standards of care for IVF,
artificial insemination, gamete Intrafallopian transfer, and other ART
services that are inherently risky.
This may not happen, given the politicized nature of the ACA in
particular and health care in general.161 Congress may not be moved to
increase Essential Health Benefits under the ACA any time soon. That said,
if Congress fails to act in the best interests of ART consumers in the United
States, insurance companies could pick up the slack. It is to insurance
companies benefits to ensure that healthy children are born through IVF, so
they will not have to pay for as expensive infant care resulting from multi158

See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1), which
lists the “Essential Health Benefits” that every insurer must provide under the Patient
Protection and ACA.
159 Davidson, supra note 24, at 159 (Internal quotation marks omitted).
160 Id.
161 See generally Juliet Eilperin, Amy Goldstein, and Carolyn Y. Johnson, White House’s
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fetal births.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Oversight of ART generally, and IVF in particular, would be
beneficial to the ART market in the United States. It could create a reliable,
predictable market for consumers and insurers. It would create protections
for consumers who currently lack legal recourse for harms suffered through
ART. Insurance companies could use the guidance provided by a federal
regulatory body to determine which procedures are best suited for coverage,
which could protect consumers from undergoing ineffective or unreliable
procedures.
Most importantly, regulation would increase trust of ART and use of
ART, by normalizing the process and making it more familiar to the public.
By regulating the market, Congress could create a partnership between
ART consumers, ART providers, and the public, thereby creating a forum
for public debate about infertility treatment and the ART market.162 IVF
provides hope to infertile couples all over the world, but if providers’
interest is placed above consumers’ interest and public health, generally,
it’s less likely that anyone will want to take advantage of the technological
advance.
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